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Special Commentary: After COVID-19:
American Landpower in Transatlantic Context
May 01, 2020 | Dr. John R. Deni
Over the last month, an array of analysts and experts has attempted to ascertain what the
post-pandemic world might look like from strategic, policy, or institutional perspectives. Several
of these assessments feature dramatic predictions of a new world unlike what existed just
months ago. It’s reasonable to expect change following a global crisis, but the near
breathlessness detectable in some of these analyses evinces a lack of nuance or an appreciation
for stasis. Moreover, few of these or other analyses have addressed the implications in a
transatlantic context, or suggested specific mitigation steps. This brief essay reflects a more
balanced attempt to fill these gaps, identifying recommendations for the US Army and
Department of Defense to leverage the crisis and mitigate the damage across the transatlantic
community.
A NEW WORLD ORDER?
Strategists, academics, and pundits have begun trying to assess how the COVID-19
pandemic will impact the world order, national security, and the Department of Defense. Some
have argued that the pandemic has essentially changed the global order and will include such
manifestations as dramatically lower defense budgets and deep cuts to military end strength,
modernization efforts, and acquisition programs. Others argue that the need to defend the
American people from threats inside the homeland will quickly displace those from overseas.
Aside from the fact that many of these analyses are purely conjectural, there appears to be an
unusual kind of American exceptionalism underpinning them. The United States hasn’t
experienced an epidemic in a century – SARS, MERS, Ebola, and Zika were all centered outside
the continental United States and typically far from American shores. So, thinking about the
impact of an epidemic that’s now spread across the entire country and throughout the world is a
novel challenge for most contemporary analysts. Yet if we examine how the countries that were
affected by SARS and other epidemics responded post-peak, one of the obvious conclusions is
that those countries did not shed their interest in statecraft or national defense as traditionally
conceived. In other words, human security did not displace national security.

More tangibly, while the defense budget may eventually – after the crisis has passed and
economic growth has returned – experience downward pressure in a sequestration sequel, there
is no evidence to suggest that national security threats from Russia or China are dissipating.
Moscow has continued its destabilizing military activities in Europe, including violations of
airspace and ongoing support for separatist attacks in eastern Ukraine. Likewise, Beijing has
continued to push its territorial ambitions in the South China Sea, declaring contested territory
its own and conducting hostile military maneuvers against the Philippines.
Similarly, both Russia and China have seized on the pandemic as an opportunity to further
their own information warfare narratives. In Russia’s case, aside from spreading basic
disinformation and conspiracy theories, the primary message from the Kremlin seems to be that
Western institutions aren’t up to the task of responding to the crisis and managing the fallout.
Meanwhile, Beijing seems intent on promoting China as an indispensable, responsible
international actor that was blameless in the initial rise and worldwide spread of the virus and
whose state authoritarian system is more effective and efficient than other models of
governance.
WHAT LIES AHEAD AND WHAT MUST BE DONE
The ongoing, nearly systemic challenges presented by Russia and China will provide plenty
of justification for hawks on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue to argue for a large defense
budget. At the same time, it is likely the US defense industry – and the politicians whose
constituents depend on defense jobs – will position itself as part of the post-pandemic solution.
Moreover, history tells us that it would be unwise to underestimate the willingness of American
leaders to shoulder debt in the name of maintaining a robust national defense while avoiding
hard political choices.
To be clear, the most dramatic assessments and forecasts outlined earlier are possible, just
not very likely. What then should we expect are the more probable characteristics of a postpandemic transatlantic environment over the coming 12-24 months? Four factors appear more
compelling and more likely. First, the COVID-19 response has shown both sides of the Atlantic
the limits of international collaboration for solving international problems. In particular, the
apparent lack of coordination between Europe and the United States, and stories that
Washington was undercutting its allies in the hunt for medical supplies have undermined
collective action and weakened allied solidarity. This comes on top of reportedly dismal
transatlantic relations at the highest levels of government, and concerns that the White House
has abandoned international leadership more broadly.
To help prevent shortcomings in the COVID-19 response from further undermining US
interest in a strong transatlantic relationship, the Department of Defense should develop plans
for a sustained campaign of humanitarian relief aimed at US allies and partners in Europe still
in the throes of the pandemic. Then, as the worst of the virus peaks in the United States in the
coming weeks, the Pentagon ought to posture the US military for larger scale assistance

deliveries and distribution across Europe under the umbrella of NATO’s disaster response
coordination center. Washington appears willing to respond to an Italian request for help, but
more can and should be done proactively along these same lines. This would at least reinforce
the position of the US military – if not the American political class – as the trusted guarantor of
transatlantic stability and security, which would subsequently strengthen strategic deterrence
and assurance. All of this must be coupled with a robust, centrally coordinated information
campaign to describe and explain all that the alliance and its member states are doing to help
each other. NATO has only recently appeared to have begun aggressively promoting mutual
assistance efforts; US Army information operations should provide supporting fires for
audiences across Europe and North America while more aggressively targeting and disabling
Russian and Chinese information operations. In short, solidarity among allies is vital, but so too
is overwhelming evidence of solidarity.
Second, economic dislocation will likely push NATO allies to deficit spend on economic
stimulus and reinvest in social safety nets that were undercut during years of austerity, resulting
in less funding available for defense budgets. In a worst-case scenario, the Eurozone economies
could contract by 15 percent, or roughly three times the degree of contraction during the Great
Recession of just over a decade ago. One of the enduring lessons of Europe’s response to that
crisis is that greater stimulus is necessary in order to recover more quickly, thereby preventing
populist parties from gaining additional strength.
Defense budgets under pressure will make interoperability a greater challenge, especially for
smaller and medium-sized allies but increasingly for the larger allies like the UK, Germany,
France, and Italy. As allies make national level decisions on whether and how to cut defense
spending, force structure, and modernization, the ability of US and allied militaries to work
together will diminish. Moreover, until a vaccine is widely available, governments may be
reluctant to send military units to participate in exercises. For example, Exercise Defender
Europe 20, slated to unfold this spring, was to be the largest deployment of US troops for an
exercise in Europe since the end of the Cold War, but it was curtailed thanks to the pandemic
and is not slated to occur again at division scale until 2022.
To mitigate these challenges, the United States should ensure all NATO allies can conduct
and participate in distributed virtual and constructive training, while overcoming the stovepiping that can occur with multiple types of training systems. The US Army can help to
accomplish this objective through its Joint Multinational Simulation Center in Germany,
providing best practices and helping to better synchronize differing training systems. Such
efforts will help ensure allies can still maintain and build interoperability, even while remaining
at home station. Additionally, the US Army should prioritize alliance-wide plug-and-play
interoperability over framework nation concepts. The latter involve a single, typically larger ally
leading a group of other, often smaller allies in developing or fielding a particular capability or
force structure element. While touted as helping participating countries make more efficient use
of their limited defense resources, framework nation concepts risk tying smaller allies too
closely to specific, larger allies, which as noted may be increasingly stretched fiscally. A broader

plug-and-play approach across the entire alliance – in terms of operations, doctrine, and
equipment – in which a company from any ally can operate within a battalion of any other ally
can help promote a wider degree of interoperability, regardless of national recovery rates or
willingness to participate in a specific mission.
Third, Europe is likely to become an increasingly contested geopolitical space over the next
12-24 months. As noted above, Russia and China have already begun information operations
tied to COVID-19 response in Europe in pursuance of their respective goals. In the case of
Russia, Moscow will likely use aid flows to build goodwill within certain EU countries in order to
undermine the consensus on continued sanctions. In China’s case, Beijing will likely leverage its
assistance in the name of alleviating growing pressure on its predatory, exploitative commercial
activities in Europe.
Given the second-to-none US-EU trade and investment relationship, common transatlantic
values, and similar geopolitical interests in Europe and beyond, it’s in American interests to
contest and roll back Russian and Chinese efforts. For the Department of Defense, this might
take the form of increased funding for European defense and deterrence efforts – slated to drop
in FY21 – as well as further steps to reinforce American military presence on the continent.
Although the US Army is moving ahead with plans to forward station in Europe a field artillery
brigade headquarters, two Multiple Launch Rocket Systems battalions and supporting units,
and a Short-Range Air Defense battalion, more can and should be done in terms of forward
stationing (vice rotational stationing). This is especially so in terms of heavy forces, combat
aviation, military mobility, intelligence, electronic warfare capabilities, and command and
control. Additionally, the US Army could provide company-size contributions to the German-,
Canadian-, and UK-led battlegroups in the Baltic States on a rotational basis, drawn from
CONUS or forward-stationed units in Europe. Putting American boots on the ground
continuously in the Baltic States would strengthen both deterrence and assurance in
northeastern Europe, even if they were stationed there only on a rotational basis.
Likewise, given the curtailing of Exercise Defender Europe 20, the Pentagon ought to
reschedule the division-size event for 2021, vice waiting until 2022. This long overdue major
training event would not simply have sent unmistakable messages of deterrence to Moscow and
reassurance to American allies, it would have built crucially important interoperability
necessary for the defense and reinforcement of NATO member states in Eastern Europe.
Waiting until 2022 to test whether and how the United States can send a division’s worth of
troops and equipment across the Atlantic Ocean and the European continent is shortsighted and
risks undermining alliance security and deterrence.
Finally, the virus is likely to cause as much harm to Russia as it does to the United States and
the European Union. After initially claiming that the virus was under control amid reports that
the Russian government was under reporting the extent of the virus, the Kremlin has seen cases
rise dramatically. Thanks to Russia’s vast geography, its underdeveloped domestic
transportation system, and its relatively poor healthcare system, the virus is likely to play out

more slowly as a disparate collection of major outbreaks, vice a single national outbreak such as
what has occurred in most European countries.
This will likely impact Russian security in two ways. First, readiness may be affected as
increasing numbers of Russian troops and draftees become infected. While the Kremlin has
tried to downplay the impact on military personnel, it seems likely that numerous military units
will be affected and that the induction of 2020 draftees will be delayed by quarantine measures.
Second, the Russian defense sector is likely to experience a production slowdown. With only a
fraction of employees reporting for work and supply chains under stress, production for both
domestic and international customers is likely to slow down.
The US Army and the Department of Defense can exploit these Russian difficulties. For
example, ongoing Russian asymmetric operations outlined above juxtaposed with shortcomings
in the Kremlin’s capacity to respond to the pandemic and Putin’s efforts to push responsibility to
regional governors ought to be leveraged within the transatlantic community as well as across
Eurasia. Portrayed together in this way, these narrative strands paint a picture of a central
government more interested in provoking the West and protecting the powerful than in taking
care of average Russian people. Additionally, assuming the virus peaks in the United States and
the West earlier than it does across the vast expanse of Russian territory – as seems likely – the
US Army and its NATO counterparts ought to offer (very publicly) medical and humanitarian
assistance to Russia.
CONCLUSION
In sum, COVID-19 is likely to bring many changes, but traditional security challenges from
Russia and China aren’t going away. Indeed, even as they fight the virus at home, Moscow and
Beijing are leveraging the pandemic for their own ends internationally as well as domestically.
The Pentagon can best respond by discerning the most likely characteristics of the postpandemic world while simultaneously calculating how to limit damage to American advantages
and leveraging opportunities to favorably compete against adversaries.
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